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Notes
LABOR LAW - POWER OF STATE COURT TO AWARD
DAMAGES FOR PEACEFUL PICKETING
Plaintiffs, operators of two retail lumber yards, were asked
by defendant unions to sign a contract containing a union shop
provision. Plaintiffs refused to sign the contract because none
of their employees wished to join the unions. As a result, the
unions began peacefully picketing the plaintiffs' premises.
Plaintiffs filed suit in state court for an injunction and dam-
ages and at the same time filed a representation petition with
the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB dismissed the
petition because the amount of interstate commerce involved
did not meet the minimum monetary standards. The state court
issued an injunction and awarded plaintiffs damages, holding
that the purpose of the picketing was to compel acceptance of
the rejected contract. On appeal, the unions contested this find-
ing, claiming that the only purpose of their activities was to
educate the workers and persuade them to become union mem-
bers. The State Supreme Court affirmed,' holding that picket-
ing to compel acceptance of the contract constituted an unfair
labor practice under Section 8 (b) (2) of the Labor Management
Relations Act and hence was not protected under state law. On
the same day the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision on certiorari in the instant case,2 it also rendered its
decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board3 and Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,4 which held that
where union activity affects interstate commerce, thereby fall-
ing within federal statutory regulation, the state's power to
grant relief of an equitable nature is preempted. Because the
Court found that those cases controlled this one in its major
aspects, it vacated the judgment below and remanded the case.
Because the state court did not specify whether the damage
award was based upon state or federal law the United States
Supreme Court did not reach the question relative to the pro-
priety of the state court's action in this respect. The case was
1. Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1
(1955).
2. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
3. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
4. 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
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remanded to determine whether the award of damages should
be sustained under state law. The state court then set aside
the injunction but sustained the award of damages,5 relying on.
tort provisions of the California Civil Code and state enact-
ments dealing with labor relations. On second certiorari the
United States Supreme Court held, reversed. Because the NLRB
has not ruled upon the status of the union conduct, and because
the activity might be within Section 7 or Section 8 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, the state's jurisdiction to award
damages is preempted. Four Justices concurred in the result
upon the ground that the union's activity might be considered
protected under the Labor Management Relations Act. However,
the concurring Justices felt that the state court's power to award
damages should be sustained if the union's conduct were deemed
federally prohibited. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (U.S. 1959).
As there is a need for uniformity in the regulation of labor
relations affecting interstate commerce, a determination by Con-
gress that certain activity is deemed to be protected and other
activity to be prohibited must be respected by state courts. Such
a determination was made by Congress in the passage of the
LMRA. Under this act, the NLRB was given primary juris-
diction over labor disputes affecting interstate commerce," and
has authority to determine in each case whether the conduct
involved violates federal law or is protected under the Labor
Management Relations Act. If there is a possibility that the
conduct is either protected or prohibited, state courts cannot
assert jurisdiction, 7 due to the conflict with federal policy objec-
tives which may result. Therefore, states can neither interfere
with employees' freedom to choose their own collective bargain-
ing representatives" nor fetter the employees' rights to partici-
pate in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining.9 Further, the states may not enjoin, under their
5. Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d
473 (1958).
6. L.M.R.A. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (1947) provides that: "This power
[of the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practies] shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise" provided that the Board may, by agreement, cede juris-
diction to a state agency, unless the applicable provision of the state statute is
inconsistent with the LMRA.
7. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1954) ; Garner v. Teamsters,
346 U.S. 485 (1953).
8. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
9. Amalgamated Association v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951) ; International
Union of UAA & A. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
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own laws, conduct which has been made an unfair:labor: prac-
tice Iunder the federal act.10  Even where the NLRB fails to
assert its jurisdiction, for budgetary or other reasons," the
United States Supreme Court has held that Congress has com-
pletely preempted state power to grant equitable relief.' 2 How-
ever, where Congress has expressed no opinion as to the status
of certain conduct, it is the Court which must decide in each
case whether the conduct may be fairly considered protected or
prohibited. If the Court decides that Congress has not impliedly
dealt with the activity, state courts may be allowed to act. Such
tactics as unannounced work stoppages and slowdowns employed
by a union seeking unstated objectives may fall within neither
protected nor prohibited categories. Thus, state courts may act
or the conduct will be entirely ungoverned.1 3 Another area in
which state courts have been allowed to grant relief is where
violence and mass picketing have been employed in labor dis-
putes. Because Congress has not clearly manifested an intention
to exclude states from asserting their traditional police powers
in labor disputes, the United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently upheld state court injunctions directed at such con-
duct.14 Although the national act provides injunctive relief 5 and
10. Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
11. The NLRB may decline jurisdiction when it feels that the policy of the
act will not be effectuated by entertaining jurisdiction in a particular case, or
when small businesses having only local significance are involved. The NLRB
declines jurisdiction where the amount of the employer's business falls below the
dollar volume standards published by the Board periodically. See 42 L.R.R.M..96
(1958).
12. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
13. This area of the law is not wholly clear. In International Union UAW v.
WERB, 336 U.S. 245, 265 (1949), the Supreme Court, dealing with unannounced
work stoppages and slow-downs employed by the union, said that this conduct "'to
win unstated ends was neither forbidden by federal statute nor was it legalized
and approved thereby." Consequently, there was "no basis for denying to Wis-
consin the power, in governing her internal affairs, to regulate a course of con-
duct neither made a right under federal law nor a violation of it and which has
the coercive effect obvious in this device." However, in Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), the Court stated that where Congress has not for-
bidden certain conduct there may be an intent to remove such activity from all
government regulation. In the instant case, the majority suggests that where
activity is neither protected nor prohibited, the question is then raised as to
whether such actitity may be regulated by the states. The concurring Justices,
however, felt that the question was closed by International Union, UAW v.
WERB, there being "no pre-emption when the conduct charged is in fact neither
protected nor prohibited." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 3
L. Ed.2d 775, 788, 79 Sup. Ct. 773, 784 (1959).
14. International Union, UAAAIW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) ; Young-
dahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) ; United Automobile, A. & AIW v.
WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, UERMW vi WERB,
315 U.S. 740 (1942).
15. L.M.R.A. §§ 1O(j), (1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (1947).
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damages 16 to compensate for such conduct, it appears that the
states' concern for domestic tranquility overrides any need for
federal administrative action. The United States Supreme Court
has also recognized the states' power, in certain instances, to
redress injuries by awarding damages. In United Construction
Workers v. Laburnum 7 an employer brought an action against
the union for damages based on violent conduct. The state court
found the defendant's conduct was a common law tort. The
United States Supreme Court, although assuming that an unfair
labor practice was involved, nevertheless allowed state court
jurisdiction because there was no compensatory relief under
the federal act in conflict with the state's remedy. However,
the Court did not discuss whether the same result would follow
if only peaceful activity was involved. In International Union,
U.A.A. and A.I.W. v. Russel' 8 the Court was again faced with
the problem of state damages awards arising from labor rela-
tions. In that case, a non-union employee was prevented from
working due to violent picketing. The Supreme Court found
that the picketing was not protected by the federal act and the
state court's jurisdiction was sustained because Congress, al-
though allowing partial relief through back pay, had not pre-
empted the state's common law power to give damages. The
Court apparently felt that there was no conflict between the
state and federal remedies although an employee might recover
damages in a tort action in a state court, but possibly be denied
the administrative remedy of back pay by the NLRB. The Court
distinguished prior preemption cases as having excluded state
action through fear that one tribunal would enjoin conduct
which others might find legal. The United States Supreme Court
has also allowed a state court to award damages in an action for
breach of contract by an employee against his union. 9
Thus at this point it appears that state tribunals must yield
jurisdiction to the NLRB where the conduct in question may be
fairly considered either as protected or prohibited by the fed-
eral act.20 The fact that the NLRB fails to assert its jurisdiction
does not give the states power to act.21 However, where violence
16. L.M.R.A. § 303(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a), (b) (1947).
17. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
18. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
19. International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
20. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1954) ; Garner v. Teamsters,
346 U.S. 485 (1953).
21. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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is involved, state courts may provide injunctive relief.2 State
courts may also award damages for the consequences of tortious
conduct, 23 as well as for those activities which are on the fringe
of federal regulation,24 such as the breach of contract case.
Because the peaceful conduct involved in the instant case
arguably falls within one of the protected or prohibited cate-
gories of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Supreme
Court was faced with a damage suit arising from a situation
covered by federal legislation. Neither Laburnum nor Russell
specifically decided whether a state court could grant damages
when only peaceful conduct was involved. In the instant case
this Court concludes that these decisions are to be restricted to
situations involving violence. It must be remembered that the
Supreme Court has consistently denied the states' power to grant
injunctive relief in the absence of violence. The Court now
points out that regulation of labor relations by the states can
be effectively exerted through an award of damages as through
injunctive relief. Consequently, to avoid the double standards
of regulation which may result, the states are deprived of power
to award damages in the absence of violence. Hence, it appears
that the effect of the instant case is to place compensatory dam-
ages and injunctive relief on a parity, the states being deprived
of jurisdiction regardless of the remedy sought, unless, of course,
violence is involved.
Where Congress has not specifically categorized certain con-
duct as prohibited or protected, the Court will be faced with a
policy decision and necessarily will have to determine whether
state action will conflict with the federal statute. Where the
Court concludes that conduct is protected, a greater chance of
conflict arises between state and federal action than where the
conduct in question is prohibited and violates both state and
federal law. Consequently, the concurring Justices adhere to the
distinction between protected and prohibited conduct, allowing
state courts to levy damages against the latter. The concurring
opinion is strengthened by the fact that (prior to the instant
case) Laburnum could be interpreted to mean that a state may
remedy the consequences of tortious conduct which is unpro-
22. See note 13 supra.
23. International Union, UAA & AIW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
24. International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)
Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
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tected by the federal act, whether the conduct be violent or
peaceful. The majority, however, seemed to feel that conflict
will result unless the expert administrative agency, rather than
a state court, decides the issues in a labor controversy. The
majority may be adhering to the proposition that states should
not be allowed to establish their own labor policy as such.25 As-
sault, battery, and mass picketing can certainly be distinguished
from a labor controversy. However, when only peaceful activity
is involved, being so completely enmeshed in a labor contro-
versy covered by the federal act, regulation by the states will
necessarily affect national policy objectives. The result of the
majority decision and prior jurisprudence is to deprive the plain-
tiff of all remedies administered by both the federal and state
governments. This appears to be an undesirable result. The
concurring Justices apparently felt that the regulatory effect,
if any, of allowing a state court to award damages must be
subordinated to the need for a remedy to prevent a small busi-
nessman from being forced out of business, or a union from
being extinguished, as a result of conduct found by a state court
to be tortious.
The 1959 amendments to the Labor Management Relations
Act26 are designed to solve some of the preemption problems in
the labor field. The new act provides that the NLRB may de-
cline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute where the
effect on interstate commerce is not sufficient to warrant the
exercise of jurisdiction. But, the Board cannot decline to assert
jurisdiction over any dispute which it would have handled under
the monetary standards in effect as of August 1, 1959. It ap-
pears that the Board may lower its monetary standards and
assert jurisdiction over a greater number of cases; but it cannot
raise its standards in such a way as to take fewer cases. Where
the volume of business transacted by the employer is below the
board's jurisdictional standards, the new amendments allow the
states to assert jurisdiction. There should be no need for the
Board specifically to decline to assert its jurisdiction. It appears
that once the NLRB has issued its dollar volume standards, the
state courts may immediately assert jurisdiction over those
cases involving industries whose volume of business falls below
those standards. However, problems will arise in cases which
25. Coo, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 H. Av. L. REv. 1297
(1954).
26. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 701 (1959).
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meet the Board's monetary standards; but the plaintiff fails to
present his case to the NLRB, the Board's General Counsel re-
fuses to'issue a complaint, or the Board finds no violation of the
Labor Management Relations Act. In such cases it would appear
that existing preemption principles will remain valid; and con-
sequently, state court or state agency action will be precluded.
Charles R. Lindsay
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE- INTERVENTION BY INSURED IN
ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER THE DIRECT ACTION STATUTE
Following a two-car collision, plaintiff, driver of one car,
brought a direct action for damages against the other driver's
insurer. The insured intervened, claiming damages against the
plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's negligence was the
cause of the collision. Plaintiff's objection to the intervention
was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, the Orleans Court
of Appeal held that the intervention should have been dismissed.'
On certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court, he/d, reversed.
In, a suit against an insurer under the Direct Action Statute,2
the insured is an interested party and can intervene to assist in
proving plaintiff's fault and to recover damages from the plain-
tiff for injuries sustained in the collision. Emmco Insurance
Company v. Globe Indemnity Company, 236 La. 286, 111 So.2d
115 (1959).
Article 390 of the Louisiana Code of Practice provides that
a prospective intervener must have "an interest in the success
of'either of the parties to the suit, or an interest opposed to
both."3 The term "interest" has not been clearly defined by the
jurisprudence. 4 It has been suggested, however, that it must be
1. Emmeo Ins. Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 105 So.2d 748, 752 (La. App.
1958) : "The so-called intervention in the instant suit being an independent claim
asserted by intervenor against one of the plaintiffs, it seems to us it does not
meet the test of law that the intervention must be one that must fall in the event
of the dismissal of plaintiff's suit. This intervention, if such were authorized by
law, could only have been dismissed in the event the plaintiffs were successful
in their suit against the defendant !"
2. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
3. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 390 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:390 (1950).
4. See Blodgett Construction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, Caddo Levee
District, 153 La. 623, 96 So. 281 (1922) (contractor was allowed to intervene in
suit by subcontractor against levee board to recover balance due on work done) ;
Fortner's Heirs v. Pine Good Lumber Co., 146 La. 11, 83 So. 319 (1919) (person
1959)
